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Introduction 
While Cho was a student at Virginia Tech, his professors, fellow 
students, campus police, the Office of Judicial Affairs, the Care Team, and 
the Cook Counseling Center all had dealings with him that raised questions 
about his mental stability.  There is no evidence that Cho’s parents were 
ever told of these contacts, and they say they were unaware of his problems 
at school.  Most significantly, there is no evidence that Cho’s parents, his 
suitemates, and their parents were ever informed that he had been 
temporarily detained, put through a commitment hearing for voluntary 
admission, and found to be a danger to himself. Efforts to share this 
information were impeded by laws about privacy of information, according 
to several university officials and the campus police. Indeed, the 
university’s attorney, during one of the panel’s open hearings and in 
private meetings, told the panel that the university could not share this 
information due to privacy laws.1 
 
— Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel 
 
On April 16, 2007, college senior Seung-Hui Cho embarked on a 
shooting rampage on the Blacksburg campus of the Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University (Virginia Tech or University).2  Thirty-two 
students and faculty members were murdered, and another seventeen were 
left wounded.3  As the law enforcement, health care, legal, and academic 
communities began to evaluate what could have been done to prevent this 
shooting, a common question emerged:  Did privacy laws contribute to the 
Virginia Tech tragedy?4  As this Article reveals, the answer is not altogether 
clear, so perhaps the most accurate response is yes, no, and maybe.5 
                                                                                                                 
 1. THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Chapter V:  Information Privacy Laws, in MASS 
SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 63, 63 (2007) [hereinafter Information Privacy Laws], 
available at http://www.vtreviewpanel. org/report/report/12_CHAPTER_V.pdf. 
 2. See THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Chapter I:  Background and Scope, in MASS 
SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 5, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Background and Scope], available at 
http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/report/08_CHAPTER_I.pdf (noting that Cho shot and 
killed others and himself on April 16, 2007). 
 3. See id. ("On April 16, 2007, one student, senior Seung Hui Cho, murdered [thirty-
two] and injured [seventeen] students and faculty in two related incidents on the campus of 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (‘Virginia Tech’)."). 
 4. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 63 (questioning the lack of 
communication and misunderstanding regarding privacy laws among University 
administrators, mental health professionals, faculty and staff). 
 5.  The recent shooting in Tucson, Arizona highlights the difficulty in answering this 
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An examination of the privacy laws in place at the time of the incident 
reveals that there were no legal barriers preventing anyone with knowledge 
of Cho’s increasingly troubled behavior from notifying his parents.6  Yet, a 
common perception among faculty and administrators, both at Virginia 
Tech and in the academic community-at-large, was that federal laws 
prohibited teachers and administrators from discussing any information 
regarding a student outside of a limited group, excluding even a student’s 
parents.7  Fear is a strong motivating factor, and it was perhaps the fear of 
violating federal law that prevented many Virginia Tech administrators, law 
enforcement personnel, mental health care workers, and even a local 
magistrate from sharing critical information regarding Cho’s behavior with 
his family.8 
In that vein, this Article evaluates the legal contours of relevant state 
and federal privacy laws as they existed at the time of the shooting,9 
                                                                                                                 
question.  In Fall 2010, a twenty-two year old student named Jared Lee Loughner caught the 
attention of administrators at Pima Community College.  See Timothy Noah, Class Clown:  
Why Was it So Hard to Kick Loughner out of Pima Community College?, SLATE.COM, Jan. 
10, 2011, available at www.slate.com/id/2280704.  Loughner had a history of disruptive 
outbursts in the classroom and across campus, so much so that his troubling behavior raised 
safety concerns among students and faculty alike.  Id.  Consequently, Loughner was 
suspended from school, and both he and his parents were told that he would be unable to 
return to class unless he obtained “a mental health clearance indicating that, in the opinion of 
a mental health professional, his presence at the college does not present a danger to himself 
or others.”  See Linda Feldmann, Why Jared Loughner was Allowed to Buy a Gun, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 10, 2011.  Had Loughner been found to “constitute a danger 
to himself or others,” he not only would have been prohibited from returning to class, but he 
likely would have been prohibited from purchasing a gun under Arizona state law.  Id.  But 
Loughner chose not to receive a mental health evaluation, opting instead to drop out of 
school.  And on January 8, 2011, he embarked on a shooting rampage in Tucson that left six 
people dead and fourteen others wounded.  See Noah, supra.  In this instance, privacy laws 
did not prevent the college from notifying Loughner’s parents of the erratic behavior 
observed by many; however, this tragic event raises the question of whether these same 
privacy laws may have discouraged others, particularly those in a position to intervene, from 
inquiring about Loughner’s mental condition at a much earlier point in time. 
 6. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 63 ("When seen clearly, the 
privacy laws contain many provisions that allow for information sharing where necessary."). 
 7. See id. (explaining that "professors, fellow students, campus police, the Office of 
Judicial Affairs, the Care Team, and the Cook Counseling Center all had dealings with [Cho] 
that raised questions about his mental stability" but "[e]fforts to share this information was 
impeded by [perceptions concerning] laws about privacy of information"). 
 8. See id. ("Privacy laws can block some attempts to share information, but even 
more often may cause holders of such information to default to the nondisclosure option—
even when laws permit the option to disclose . . . .  A narrow interpretation of the law is the 
least risky course . . . ."). 
 9. See infra Part I (discussing the privacy laws in effect in 2007). 
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examines two critical lapses of information sharing regarding Cho’s mental 
health,10 and explores the pervasive misperceptions regarding student 
privacy laws that prevented many faculty and administrators from speaking 
up.11 
The underlying assumption throughout this discussion, of course, is 
that Cho’s actions could have been forestalled through the sharing of 
information between Virginia Tech and his parents.12  While the validity of 
this assumption necessarily must remain untested, common experience 
suggests that the disclosure of at least some of the critical incidents leading 
up to the shooting could have led to greater intervention and treatment by 
either Cho’s family or Virginia Tech.13  At best, it is clear that nobody had a 
full understanding of the emotional problems embedded in the shooter’s 
psyche.14 
I.  Legal Landscape Governing Student Privacy in 2007 
The privacy of Cho’s mental health and educational records—from his 
early childhood development through his postsecondary education—was 
governed by a menagerie of state and federal statutes and regulations,15 
including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See infra Part II (discussing how Cho abandoned care for his mental health when 
he began attending college and how Virginia Tech failed to appreciate the collective 
significance of Cho’s behavior in college). 
 11. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that overly strict interpretations of federal and 
state privacy laws impeded Virginia Tech faculty and administrators from voicing their 
concerns). 
 12. See, e.g., Michael Sluss & Reed Williams, The Virginia Tech Report:  Study It, 
Kaine Says, ROANOKE TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, available at http://www.roanoke.com/ 
vtinvestigation/wb/wb/xp-130184 (emphasizing that Cho’s parents could have been 
contacted concerning his mental stability despite university officials’ failure to do so) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 13. See THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Chapter IV:  Mental Health History of Seung 
Hui Cho, in MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 31, 54 (2007) [hereinafter Mental Health 
History], available at http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/report/11_CHAPTER_IV.pdf 
(finding that "[r]epeated incidents of aberrant, dangerous, or threatening behavior [by a 
student] should be reported to the [Virginia Tech] counseling center and reported to 
parents"). 
 14. See Background and Scope, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that the panel "identifie[d] 
major administrative or procedural failings leading up to the events, such as failing to 
‘connect the dots’ of Cho’s highly bizarre behavior"). 
 15. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 63–68 (discussing the privacy laws 
pertaining to troubled students). 
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(HIPAA),16 the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),17 and 
various regulations issued by the U.S. Departments of Education and Health 
and Human Services.18  Taken together, the prohibitions on disclosure 
embodied in these laws created an atmosphere that discouraged critical 
information sharing among Virginia Tech administrators, mental health 
providers, and Cho’s parents.19 
A.  Privacy of Health Records 
The privacy of an individual’s personal health information is governed 
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and related 
federal regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services.20  In many areas, federal law is further supplemented by state 
medical privacy laws.21  Together, these laws govern whether "covered 
entities,"22 such as physicians, nurses, therapists, counselors, and social 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2006) (outlining the provisions of HIPAA). 
 17. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (outlining the provisions of FERPA). 
 18. See Information of Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 65 (stating that "[t]he federal 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and regulations by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services establish the federal [medical privacy] standards"). 
 19. See id. at 68 (stating that "[t]he problems presented by a seriously troubled student 
often require a group effort" but "[i]nformation privacy laws cannot help students if the law 
allows sharing but agency policy or practice forbids necessary sharing"). 
 20. See id. at 65 ("The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 and regulations by the Secretary of Health and Human Services establish the federal 
standards [that govern information privacy laws].  Together, the law and regulations are 
commonly known as ‘HIPAA.’"). 
 21. See id. ("Both state and federal law govern privacy of medical information.").  In 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, the disclosure of patient health information is governed by 
the Virginia Health Records Privacy Act ("VHRPA"), a state law analogue to HIPAA.  Id.  
The VHRPA and HIPAA offer similar protections over patient health information and, in 
many respects, can be analyzed congruently.  See THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Appendix 
H:  Summary of Information Privacy Laws and Guidance from U.S. Department of 
Education, in MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 63 app. at H–3 (2007) [hereinafter 
Summary of Laws], available at http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/report/26_APPENDIX 
_H.pdf ("In most respects, the federal and state laws are similar and can be analyzed 
together.").  Nonetheless, HIPAA preempts VHRPA wherever the state law offers less 
protection over health information than federal law.  See id. at H-3 ("HIPAA can pre-empt a 
state law, making the state law ineffective.  This generally occurs when state law is less 
protective of privacy than federal law."); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(A)(3) 
(2006) (stating that Virginia’s redisclosure prohibition does not prevent health care entities 
from making subsequent disclosures pursuant to HIPAA). 
 22. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) (defining a "covered entity" as a "health care 
provider," which is "a provider of medical or health services"). 
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workers, may disclose protected health information that "relates to the past, 
present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, 
the provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future 
payment of the provision of health care to an individual."23  The "protected 
health information"24 covered by these laws is broad, and includes 
information memorialized in records as well as information communicated 
orally or otherwise learned in the course of a patient’s treatment.25 
The use or disclosure of protected health information by covered 
entities must be done in compliance with the HIPAA "Privacy Rule."26  
Under the Privacy Rule, disclosure of protected health information can be 
made with consent of the patient or under narrowly defined statutory 
exceptions.27  For example, health care providers are required to release 
health records to patients upon request;28 however, disclosure of health 
information to third parties is permitted only under limited exceptions.29  
Relevant exceptions for the disclosure of protected health information 
include disclosures made to a patient’s relatives under emergency 
circumstances,30 disclosures made when a patient has authorized release of 
                                                                                                                 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(4)(B) (2006); see also Summary of Laws, supra note 
21, at app. at H-3 (stating that HIPAA, regulations interpreting HIPAA, and VHRPA 
govern the circumstances under which "doctors, nurses, therapists, counselors, and 
social workers, as well as HMOs, insurers, and other health organizations" may 
disclose protected health information). 
 24. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) (defining "[p]rotected health information" as 
"individually identifiable health information"). 
 25. See Summary of Laws, supra note 21, at app. at H-3–H-6 (stating that HIPAA, 
HIPAA regulations, and VHRPA allow disclosure of information contained in medical 
records or obtained through personal knowledge in certain circumstances). 
 26. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2006) (outlining the general rules governing use and 
disclosure of protected health information). 
 27. See Beverly Cohen, Reconciling the HIPAA Privacy Rule with State Laws 
Regulating Ex Parte Interviews of Plaintiffs’ Treating Physicians:  A Guide to Performing 
HIPAA Preemption Analysis,  43 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1098–1103 (2006) (describing the 
circumstances under which private health information may be disclosed to requestors other 
than the patient). 
 28. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(2)(i) (2006) ("A covered entity is required to disclose 
protected health information [t]o an individual[] when requested.");  see also VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 32.1-127.1:03(A)(1) (2006) ("Health care entities shall disclose health records to the 
individual who is the subject of the health record."). 
 29. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.50–164.514 (2006) (discussing when disclosure to a third 
party is acceptable);  see also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(D)(1) (2006) (stating that 
discussion of an individual’s health records with a third party may only occur if the patient 
gives consent (or his parent or guardian if he is a minor) or pursuant to an individual’s oral 
authorization if, during an emergency, written authorization is impractical). 
 30. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(a)(ii)(B)(3) (2006) (stating that disclosure may be made 
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information to a third party,31 disclosure among health care providers when 
necessary for a patient’s care,32 and disclosures made when an individual 
presents a "serious and imminent threat" to the health and safety of 
individuals and the public.33 
Most importantly, when protected health information is maintained by 
health care entities operated by post-secondary academic institutions 
receiving federal funding, such as university student health clinics or 
counseling centers, the privacy of protected health information related to 
students is governed by FERPA and applicable state privacy laws, rather 
than by HIPAA.34  As discussed further below, the less-rigorous restrictions 
guiding the privacy analysis under FERPA would have permitted a greater 
sharing of information related to Cho’s deteriorating mental health prior to 
the April 2007 shooting.35 
                                                                                                                 
in emergency circumstances to a patient’s relatives if the disclosure aligns with the patient’s 
prior, expressed preference or if the health provider determines, within his professional 
judgment, that disclosure serves the patient’s best interests). 
 31. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(iv) (2006) (stating that a covered provider may 
disclose a patient’s information pursuant to prior authorization). 
 32. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(4) (2006) ("A covered entity may disclose protected 
health information to another covered entity . . . if each entity either has or had a relationship 
with the individual who is the subject of the protected health information being requested, 
the protected health information pertains to such relationship, and the disclosure is [for 
treatment] . . . .");  see also VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(D)(7) (2006) (stating that health 
care entities may disclose the health records of an individual "[w]hen necessary in 
connection with the care of the individual"). 
 33. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(i)(A) (2006) (stating that a covered entity may 
disclose protected health information if "necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and 
imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public"); see also VA. CODE 
ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(D)(6) (2006) (stating that health care providers may disclose 
medical records if there is a serious threat to the health and safety of others); see also 
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:04(A)(iii) (2006) (stating that disclosure of protected 
health records is required when "necessary to prevent serious harm and serious 
threats to the health and safety of individuals and the public"). 
 34. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) ("Protected health information excludes 
individually identifiable health information in . . . education records covered by 
[FERPA]." (emphasis added)).  For Virginia Tech students, FERPA and VHRPA 
governed the privacy of protected health information maintained by the University.  
See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy laws governing 
Virginia Tech). 
 35. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 68–69 (suggesting changes to be 
made to FERPA privacy laws to promote greater clarity and communication within 
educational institutions). 
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B.  Privacy of Educational Records 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 is the key 
federal statute governing the privacy of student records maintained by 
educational institutions.36  The law applies to student records maintained by 
all federally-funded educational institutions, public or private, including 
most elementary and secondary schools, and almost all post-secondary 
institutions.37  In conjunction with regulations issued by the U.S. 
Department of Education,38 FERPA requires covered institutions to obtain 
written consent from parents or students prior to releasing protected 
education records.39  Absent written consent, records may be released only 
under limited exceptions.40 
The "education records" protected under FERPA include all records 
"which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are 
maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for 
such agency or institution."41  Though broadly defined, the term "education 
record" is limited to "records, files, documents, and other tangible 
materials."42  Notably absent from this definition, observations regarding a 
student’s behavior are not protected under FERPA, unless such 
observations are memorialized in a record, file, or document.43  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                 
 36. See Summary of Laws, supra note 21, at app. at H-4 ("Privacy of educational 
records is primarily governed by federal law, the Family Educational Rights Privacy Act of 
1974, as well as regulations that interpret the law.").  For further discussion of FERPA 
privacy provisions, see Katrina Chapman, A Preventable Tragedy at Virginia Tech:  Why 
Confusion Over FERPA’s Provisions Prevents Schools from Addressing Student Violence, 
18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 349, 352–70 (2009) (discussing the history and implications of 
FERPA). 
 37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(3) (2006) (addressing the conditional availability of 
federal funds to educational institutions); see also Lynn M. Daggett & Dixie Snow Huefner, 
Recognizing Schools’ Legitimate Educational Interests:  Rethinking FERPA’s Approach to 
the Confidentiality of Student Discipline and Classroom Records, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(2001) (noting that FERPA’s privacy protections apply to educational institutions receiving 
federally-guaranteed student loans). 
 38. See generally 34 C.F.R. §§ 91.1–91.67 (2006) (listing privacy regulations of the 
Department of Education). 
 39. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (2006) (stating that parental consent is required to 
release educational records unless certain statutory exceptions apply). 
 40. See id. (listing the exceptions under which educational records of a student may be 
released). 
 41. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. (limiting the definition of "educational records" to "information directly 
related to the student"). 
A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 149 
observations gleaned from conversations with a student are not protected 
unless later documented in a record.44 
As noted supra, FERPA, together with state health privacy laws, 
governs exclusively the privacy of student records maintained by school 
health clinics and counseling centers.45  These records are considered 
"education records" and are not protected by HIPAA.46  Yet FERPA was 
drafted primarily to regulate the privacy of education records, not health 
care information—and its success in balancing health care privacy against 
public safety was, at best, mixed in the years leading up to the Virginia 
Tech shootings.47  Similarly, guidance provided by the U.S. Department of 
Education regarding disclosure of student health records struggled to 
establish clear standards under FERPA.48 
The privacy rights afforded under FERPA belong to the parents of an 
eligible student until the student attains eighteen years of age.49  Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 66 ("Personal observations and 
conversations with a student fall outside FERPA."). 
 45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (stating that FERPA is the federal law 
that governs educational privacy records); see also Summary of Laws, supra note 21, at app. 
at H-4 ("State laws about health records also apply [to disclosure of education records].  
Disclosure is not permitted when a state law is less protective of health records privacy than 
FERPA.  However, state law can be more protective than FERPA.  State law can restrict 
disclosure that FERPA authorizes."). 
 46. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2006) (noting that state law and FERPA govern 
protection of education records). 
 47. See, e.g., Shin v. MIT, No. 02-0403, 2005 WL 1869101, at *1–5 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
June 27, 2005) (observing that university psychiatrists failed to pay serious attention to a 
student’s repeated threats of suicide); see also Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Iowa 
2000) (noting that university officials failed to notify a student’s parents of their child’s self-
destructive behavior); see also Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 602 (W.D. 
Va. 2002) (observing that university officials failed to take adequate precautions against a 
student’s self-destructive behavior).  For an excellent analysis of these cases, see Ann 
MacLean Massie, Suicide on Campus:  The Appropriate Legal Responsibility of College 
Personnel, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 625 (2008). 
 48. See Letter from LeRoy S. Looker, Dir. of the Family Policy Compliance Office, 
Dep’t of Educ., to the Associate University Counsel at the University of New Mexico (Nov. 
29, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Looker], available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/ 
guid/fpco/ferpa/library/baiseunmslc.html (advising that a student’s suicidal comments 
coupled with unsafe conduct and threats may trigger the emergency exception) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 49. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(d) (2006) ("[W]henever a student has attained eighteen 
years of age, or is attending an institution of postsecondary education, the permission or 
consent required of and the rights accorded to the parents of the student shall thereafter only 
be required of and accorded to the student."); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.5(a) (2006) ("When a 
student becomes an eligible student, the rights accorded to, and consent required of, parents 
under this part transfer from the parents to the student."). 
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information from educational records cannot be disclosed without consent 
of a parent or a legal-aged student.50  Absent consent, FERPA authorizes 
disclosure of education records under limited circumstances.51  Relevant 
statutory exceptions permit disclosure of education information to parents 
of legal-aged students who claim the student as a dependant for tax 
purposes,52 to "school officials . . . who have been determined . . . to have 
legitimate educational interests [in receiving the information],"53 and, as 
discussed below, to appropriate persons in connection with an emergency, 
so long as "the knowledge of such information is necessary to protect the 
health or safety of the student or other persons."54 
The FERPA exception permitting disclosure under an "emergency 
exception" was tempered at the time prior to the Virginia Tech shootings by 
federal regulations restricting application of the exception to "circumstances 
involving imminent, specific threats to health or safety."55  Moreover, 
according to federal regulations in place in 2007, the "emergency 
exception" was to be "narrowly construed" by administrators.56  Critically, 
FERPA and U.S. Department of Education regulations in force at the time 
left unclear the circumstances under which student health records could be 
disclosed.57  For example, in a November 2004 letter from the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Family Policy Compliance Office, the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 66 ("Information from educational 
records cannot be shared unless authorized by law or with consent of a parent, or if the 
student is enrolled in college or is 18 or older, with that student’s consent."). 
 51. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances under 
which protected information may be disclosed without consent of the individual). 
 52. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(H) (2006) (stating that records may be released to 
"parents of a dependent student of such parents, as defined in section 152 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986"). 
 53. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (2006) 
(stating that disclosure without consent is permissible "to other school officials, 
including teachers, within the agency or institution whom the agency or institution 
has determined to have legitimate educational interests"). 
 54. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I) (2006). 
 55. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that the FERPA 
"exceptions have been construed to be limited to circumstances involving imminent, 
specific threats to health or safety"). 
 56. See id. ("Although [the emergency] exception does authorize [disclosure] to a 
potentially broad group of parties, the regulations specifically state that it is to be narrowly 
construed"). 
 57. See id. (stating that "the boundaries of the emergency exceptions have not been 
defined by privacy laws or cases, and these provisions may discourage disclosure in all but 
the most obvious cases"). 
A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 151 
office responsible for interpreting FERPA provisions, to the University of 
New Mexico, regulators explained: 
[T]he University may disclose personally identifiable, non-
directory information from education records under the "health or 
safety emergency" exception only if it has determined, on a case-
by-case basis, that a specific situation presents imminent danger 
or threat to students or other members of the community, or 
requires an immediate need for information in order to avert or 
diffuse serious threats to the safety or health of a student or other 
individuals.  Any release must be narrowly tailored considering 
the immediacy and magnitude of the emergency and must be 
made only to parties who can address the specific emergency in 
question.  This exception is temporally limited to the period of the 
emergency and generally does not allow a blanket release of 
personally identifiable information from a student’s education 
records to comply with general requirements under State law.58 
In the face of such guidance, many school administrators were simply 
unwilling to release student health information in the absence of clearly 
articulable evidence establishing an imminent danger or threat.59  The 
limitation that the "narrowly tailored" release of information be  made only 
to "parties who can address the specific emergency" further discouraged 
administrators from making precautionary disclosures and thereby placing 
federal funding at risk.60   Given that the release of student records under 
FERPA’s "emergency exception" is discretionary for administrators,61 
school administrators were left to weigh the risk of loss of federal funding 
against releasing records in the face of unclear standards.62  As the Virginia 
Tech Review Panel noted, the lack of clarity in guidance regarding the 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Letter from Looker, supra note 48 (emphasis added). 
 59. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 69 (explaining that FERPA 
contains an emergency exception that is to be strictly construed, but characterizing the strict 
construction requirement as unhelpful because it "merely feeds the perception that 
nondisclosure is always a safer choice"). 
 60. See id. at 67 ("[T]he boundaries of the emergency exceptions have not been 
defined by privacy laws or cases, and these provisions may discourage disclosure in all but 
the most obvious cases."). 
 61. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I) (2006) (stating that disclosure in an emergency 
situation is permitted when "necessary"). 
 62. See THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Chapter IV:  Mental Health History of Seung Hui Cho, 
in MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 31, 52 (2007) [hereinafter Mental Health History], available 
at http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/ report/report/11_CHAPTER_IV.pdf (defining the problem as one 
of "overly strict interpretations of . . . privacy laws"). 
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application of FERPA to student health information "discourage[d] 
disclosure in all but the most obvious cases."63 
Of note, law enforcement records held exclusively by campus police 
departments are not covered under FERPA,64 and may be publicly disclosed 
in various forms at the discretion of police officials.65  Notwithstanding this 
exception, once campus law enforcement records are disclosed to university 
officials for nonlaw enforcement purposes, the FERPA provisions apply to 
the records.66  Regardless, to the extent that FERPA applies to student law 
enforcement records, it does not prohibit officers from discussing with 
parents observed conduct, behavior, or incidents involving their children 
that are not memorialized in law enforcement records.67 
Finally, FERPA allows school officials to release otherwise protected 
education records to parents who claim their adult child as a dependent for 
tax purposes.68  In a university setting, it is possible that this exception 
would apply to a vast majority of education records.69  Given that a college 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 67 ("[T]he boundaries of the 
emergency exceptions [in privacy laws] have not been defined by privacy laws or cases, and 
these provisions may discourage disclosure in all but the most obvious cases."). 
 64. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (2006) (stating that educational records do not 
include "records maintained by a law enforcement unit of the educational agency or 
institution that were created by that law enforcement unit for the purpose of law 
enforcement"). 
 65. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.8(d) (2006) ("[FERPA] neither requires nor prohibits the 
disclosure by an educational agency or institution of its law enforcement unit records."); see 
also VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3706(F) (2006) (stating that "reports submitted in confidence 
to . . . campus police departments of public institutions of higher education" are "excluded 
from [disclosure], but may be disclosed by the custodian, in his discretion, except where 
such disclosure is prohibited by law"). 
 66. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.8 (2006) (stating that FERPA does not require or prohibit 
disclosure of law enforcement records, and further noting that law enforcement records do 
not include "[r]ecords created and maintained by a law enforcement unit exclusively for a 
non-law enforcement purpose, such as a disciplinary action or proceeding conducted by the 
educational agency or institution"). 
 67. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 66 ("Personal observations and 
conversations with a student fall outside FERPA."). 
 68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (stating that education records may be released to 
"parents of a dependent student of such parents, as defined in section 152 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986"); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8) (2006) ("An educational agency 
or institution may disclose personally identifiable information from an education record of a 
student without the consent" if the student is a dependent of the parents). 
 69. See Internal Revenue Service, A "Qualifying Child", http://www.irs.gov/ 
newsroom/article/0,,id= 133298,00.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2010) (stating that any student 
may be a qualifying child if under the age of twenty-four and "a full-time student for at least 
five months of the year") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and 
Social Justice). 
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student’s tax dependent status is subject to change from matriculation to 
graduation,70 university officials will often not know whether this exception 
applies to a particular student at a given moment.71  Nonetheless, this 
information can easily be acquired through a simple query to parents.  And, 
at a minimum, such a query may alert parents that the school is seeking to 
disclose to them important information regarding their child.72 
C.  Virginia Law Regarding Student Suicide Threats 
Shortly before the Virginia Tech shootings took place, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia enacted a law requiring all public universities 
to adopt policies and procedures for handling students who present a danger 
to themselves or others.73  Though the law did not take effective until July 
1, 2007, its adoption just three weeks prior to the massacre highlighted the 
need at the time for comprehensive policies addressing students with 
suicidal ideation:74 
The governing boards of each public institution of higher education shall 
develop and implement policies that advise students, faculty, and staff, 
including residence hall staff, of the proper procedures for identifying 
and addressing the needs of students exhibiting suicidal tendencies or 
behavior. The policies shall ensure that no student is penalized or 
expelled solely for attempting to commit suicide, or seeking mental 
health treatment for suicidal thoughts or behaviors.  Nothing in this 
section shall preclude any public institution of higher education from 
establishing policies and procedures for appropriately dealing with 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See id. (discussing factors relevant to the determination of dependant-child status 
for tax purposes, and suggesting that this status may change from year-to-year). 
 71. See generally FERPA QUESTIONS FOR LEE ROOKER:  DIRECTOR OF THE FAMILY 
POLICY COMPLIANCE OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION para. 3, http://www.the 
asca.org/attachments/wysiwyg/525/FERPAQUESTIONSanswered.doc (last visited Oct. 5, 
2010) (discussing possible solutions to the difficulty in determining a student's tax dependent 
status) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 72. See, e.g., Mental Health History, supra note 13, at 49 (suggesting that if Virginia 
Tech had attempted to contact Cho’s parents, his parents would likely have sought help 
because "they were dedicated to getting [Cho] to therapy consistently and also consented to 
psychopharmacology when the need arose"). 
 73. See VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.2:8 (2007) (explaining the policies and procedures 
applicable to public universities handling suicidal or dangerous students). 
 74. See Mental Health History, supra note 13, at 60 (concluding that "the [Virginia] 
mental health system has major gaps in its entirety . . . .  These gaps prevent individuals 
from getting the psychiatric help when they are getting ill, during the need for acute 
stabilization, and when they need therapy and medication management during recovery"). 
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students who are a danger to themselves, or to others, and whose 
behavior is disruptive to the academic community.75 
Whatever policies would have been adopted by Virginia Tech prior to 
the shootings is unknown, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that such 
policies would have included greater information sharing among University 
faculty and administrators who have daily contact with students.76  At a 
minimum, policies could have included parental notification of student 
behavior under FERPA’s tax-dependent student77 or emergency 
exceptions.78  As a review of the events leading up to the shooting reveal, 
there were ample opportunities for greater information sharing regarding 
Cho’s troubling behavior in the months and years before the shootings.79 
II.  Cho’s Mental Health History:  Two Critical Communication Lapses 
Many individuals knew that gunman Seung-Hui Cho was a disturbed 
young man who had difficulty interacting with others.80  Indeed, Cho’s 
persona of extreme shyness and social isolation emerged at a very young 
age.81  From early childhood onward, Cho displayed "inordinate shyness."82  
He had few, if any, friends, and fell into a self-imposed isolation.83  As Cho 
                                                                                                                 
 75. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.2:8 (2007). 
 76. See THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, Summary of Key Findings, in MASS SHOOTINGS 
AT VIRGINIA TECH 1, 2 (2007) [hereinafter Summary of Key Findings], available at 
http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/report/07_SUMMARY.pdf (suggesting that a key problem 
with Virginia Tech’s polices was that "[n]o one knew all the information and no one connected all 
the dots [regarding Cho’s mental instability]"). 
 77. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (stating that education records may be released to 
"parents of a dependent student of such parents, as defined in section 152 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986"); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8) (2006) ("An educational agency 
or institution may disclose personally identifiable information from an education record of a 
student" to his or her parents without the consent if the student is a dependent of the parents). 
 78. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (a)(ii)(B)(3) (2006) (explaining the circumstances under 
which the emergency exception applies). 
 79. See Mental Health History, supra note 13, at 31–54 (describing the mental health 
history of Cho and the opportunities for intervention and communication). 
 80. See id. at 53 (discussing Cho’s shyness, isolation, and aberrant behavior). 
 81. See id. at 33 (observing that during Cho’s childhood, he was shy, preferred not to 
speak, and was ostracized by his peers). 
 82. See id. ("Cho’s early development was characterized by physical illness and 
inordinate shyness."). 
 83. See id. at 32–33 (discussing Cho’s lack of social interaction and isolation). 
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grew older, his elementary school teachers grew concerned over his 
emotional issues and recommended to his parents that he undergo therapy.84 
Though Cho received counseling and support during his adolescent 
years, he abandoned his support structure once he entered college.85  As 
discussed below, Cho’s mental instability had been diagnosed well before 
he became a student at Virginia Tech, yet this critical information was 
never communicated to University administrators.86  As Cho’s mental 
health deteriorated during his junior and senior years at Virginia Tech,87 
University administrators failed to inform each other, or his parents, of his 
increasingly troubled behavior.88  It is likely that these failures in 
communication resulted from a poor understanding of student privacy 
rights and the obligations of school administrators under various privacy 
laws.89 
A.  High School-to-College Transition 
1.  Key Facts:  Cho’s Middle School and High School Years 
In mid-1997, the summer before Cho entered seventh grade, his 
parents arranged for him to receive mental health counseling on advice 
from teachers,90 and he was subsequently diagnosed with severe social 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See id. at 34 (noting that "[t]he summer before Cho started seventh grade, his 
parents followed up on a recommendation from the elementary school that they seek therapy 
for Cho"). 
 85. See id. at 38 ("Before Cho left high school, the guidance counselor made sure that 
Cho had the name and contact information of a school district resource whom Cho could call 
if he encountered problems at college.  As is now known, Cho never sought that help while 
at Virginia Tech."). 
 86. See id. ("Neither Cho nor his high school revealed that he had been receiving 
special education services as an emotionally disabled student, so no one at the university 
ever became aware of these pre-existing conditions."). 
 87. See id. at 41 ("The fall semester of Cho’s junior year (2005) was a pivotal time.  
From that point forward, Cho would become known to a growing number of students and 
faculty not only for his extremely withdrawn personality and complete lack of interest in 
responding to others, in and out of the classroom, but for hostile, even violent writings along 
with threatening behavior."). 
 88. See id. at 49 ("Cho’s family did not realize what was happening with him in 
Blacksburg that fall 2005 semester . . . .  They were unaware that their son had been 
committed for a time to St. Albans Hospital or that he had appeared in court . . . .  The 
university did not inform [them]."). 
 89. See id. at 52 ("The [multidisciplinary] Care Team was hampered by overly strict 
interpretations of federal and state privacy laws (acknowledged as being overly complex)."). 
 90. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (stating that Cho’s parents enrolled him 
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anxiety disorder.91  Though Cho did not exhibit any reported behavioral 
problems at school,92 he continued to isolate himself during his early 
middle-school years.93  He remained on this quiet path until March 1999, 
the spring semester of his eighth grade year.94 
At that point, Cho began exhibiting a marked change in behavior, 
and his therapist became concerned that he had begun harboring 
homicidal or suicidal thoughts.95  She asked Cho to inform her, his 
parents, or someone at school if he experienced any such thoughts.96  
The next month, shortly after the Columbine High School shootings, 
Cho penned an essay for his English class in which he indicated that he 
wanted to "repeat Columbine."97  The middle school immediately 
contacted Cho’s parents and asked them to arrange psychiatric 
counseling for their son.98  They did so, and two months later the 
psychiatrist diagnosed Cho as suffering from selective mutism and 
major depression and he was placed on antidepressant medication.99  He 
responded well to the medication and began to exhibit a more positive 
disposition.100  He continued on the medication during his freshman year 
                                                                                                                 
in counseling after a recommendation from his elementary school). 
 91. See Mental Health History, supra note 13, at 34 (stating that a psychiatrist 
diagnosed Cho with severe emotional anxiety disorder and concluding that "Cho’s problems 
were rooted in acculturation challenges—not fitting in and difficulty with friends"). 
 92. See id. at 34 (noting that, in early middle school, Cho "had no reported behavioral 
problems and did not get into any fights"). 
 93. See id. ("Cho continued to isolate himself in [early] middle school."). 
 94. See id. at 34–35 (noting that "in March 1999, when Cho was in the spring semester 
of eighth grade, his art therapist observed a change in his behavior"). 
 95. See id. at 35 (stating that as Cho "suddenly became more withdrawn and showed 
symptoms of depression[,]" his art therapist became "concerned and asked him whether he 
had any suicidal or homicidal thoughts"). 
 96. See id. (noting that although Cho denied having violent thoughts, "his art therapist 
drew up a contract with him anyway [stating] he would do no harm to himself or to others, 
and she told him to communicate with his parents or someone at school if he did experience 
any ideas about violence"). 
 97. See id. (stating that shortly after the Columbine murders, Cho wrote a paper that 
"expressed generalized thoughts of suicide and homicide, indicating that ‘he wanted to 
repeat Columbine,’ according to someone familiar with the situation" though "no one in 
particular was named or targeted"). 
 98. See id. ("The school contacted Cho’s sister [because] she spoke English and 
explained what had happened.  The family was urged to have Cho evaluated by a 
psychiatrist."). 
 99. See id. (noting that the psychiatrist "diagnosed Cho with ‘selective mutism’ and 
‘major depression: single episode’" and "prescribed [Cho] the antidepressant Paroxetine 20 
mg"). 
 100. See id. ("Cho did quite well on this regimen [of medication]; he seemed to be in a 
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of high school, where his school records indicate no reported behavioral 
problems.101  By July 2000, Cho’s disposition appeared to improve, and 
his psychiatrist discontinued the medication.102 
One month into his sophomore year, Cho’s teachers referred him to 
the school’s guidance office because his speech was barely audible in 
class.103  Cho lied when asked by the guidance counselor whether he had 
received any mental health counseling in middle school, though his 
parents later informed the school that he was receiving therapy.104  The 
following month, the school developed an Individual Educational Plan 
for Cho to accommodate his shyness and lack of responsiveness in the 
classroom.105  He no longer had to make oral presentations and his 
grades were unaffected by his lack of oral and group participation.106  
Cho was also permitted to provide oral responses in private sessions 
with teachers rather than in front of classmates, and he was allowed to 
eat lunch alone.107  In conjunction with these accommodations, Cho 
continued regular therapy and was reported to have adjusted reasonably 
well in school.108  During his junior year, Cho resisted continuing his 
therapy, so his weekly therapy sessions ended.109 
Cho graduated from high school in June 2003.110  At the time, his 
therapist recommended to his parents that he attend a small college close 
to home, but Cho insisted on attending the much larger Virginia Tech.111  
Though his parents acceded to his request, his school guidance 
                                                                                                                 
good mood, looked brighter, and smiled more."). 
 101. See id. at 36 (stating that Cho exhibited no unusual behavioral problems during his 
high school years). 
 102. See id. at 35 (finding that, by July 2000, "[t]he doctor stopped the medication 
because Cho improved and no  longer needed the antidepressant"). 
 103. See id. at 36 (reporting that Cho was not verbally communicative in class). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. (describing in detail Cho’s Individual Education Plan). 
 106. See id. (suggesting that a modified grading scale for group and oral presentations 
was an important part of Cho’s Individual Education Plan). 
 107. See id. at 37 (discussing Cho’s Individual Education Plan). 
 108. See id. (stating that Cho made progress while in therapy). 
 109. See id. (quoting Cho allegedly telling his parents and therapist, "There is nothing 
wrong with me.  Why do I have to go?"). 
 110. See id. (discussing Cho’s transition from high school to college in 2003). 
 111. See id. at 37–38 (describing Cho’s insistence on attending Virginia Tech despite 
warnings that it was too large an institution for him). 
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counselor gave him contact information for a school counselor should he 
have any problems in college.112 
2.  First Critical Communication Lapse:  High School-to-College 
Transition 
Until Cho’s high school graduation, his parents and the local school 
system worked together to effectively treat and monitor his mental 
health.113  At the time Cho entered college, however, he had ceased 
regular therapy and was no longer receiving medication.114  His high 
school transcript contained no indication that he was given special 
accommodations in the classroom, and no one requested continued 
accommodations from Virginia Tech on his behalf.115  Virginia Tech had 
no knowledge of Cho’s long history of mental problems, nor did the 
University enquire about it.116  Critically, there was no affirmative 
obligation on Cho or his family to report his condition to Virginia Tech, 
yet no law preventing Virginia Tech from inquiring about it 
postadmission.117 
This failure to share key information regarding Cho’s mental health 
history was largely preventable.118  The laws affecting disclosure of 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See id. at 38 ("Before Cho left high school, the guidance counselor made sure that 
Cho had the name and contact information of a school district resource who Cho could call if 
he encountered problems at college."). 
 113. See id. at 36–37 (describing the collaboration between Cho’s parents and the 
school system in monitoring his mental health). 
 114. See id. at 38 (noting that, when Cho entered Virginia Tech, he was no longer 
taking medication or receiving counseling). 
 115. See id. ("Neither Cho nor his high school revealed that he had been receiving 
special education services as an emotionally disabled student . . . ."). 
 116. See id. at 38–39 (describing how Cho’s history of mental problems went 
unreported to Virginia Tech upon his enrollment). 
 117. See id. at 38–39 (observing that the law does not require a student to report 
disabilities unless he is seeking an academic adjustment).  See also Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2010) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . .").  Notably, once an 
admissions decision is made, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not prevent an educational 
institution from inquiring about an incoming student’s disability status in order to make 
accommodations.  See 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(4) (2010) (allowing educational institutions to 
make confidential inquiries after a student has been admitted). 
 118. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (discussing warning signs exhibited by Cho). 
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student health information did not prevent Cho or his family from 
informing Virginia Tech of his problems and need for 
accommodation.119  And, although, under law, Virginia Tech could make 
confidential enquiries to incoming students regarding the existence of 
disabilities or the need for special accommodation, the burden remains 
on the student to prove the existence of the disability and to request the 
appropriate accommodation.120  Yet, reliance on self-identification of a 
disability is particularly suspect when an incoming student suffers from 
a mental illness exhibited by severe communication disabilities.121 
In the aftermath of the Virginia Tech shooting, it is clear that 
postsecondary institutions should query incoming students—and their 
parents, if possible—of the need for ongoing mental health counseling 
or classroom accommodation.  With the recognition that some students 
in need may nonetheless fail to self-identify their history of mental 
illness, universities should also take steps to closely monitor students 
who display troubling behavior after matriculation and contact parents 
whenever appropriate.  As the Cho case highlights, Virginia Tech’s 
failure to take this latter step after Cho repeatedly became a cause of 
concern on campus forms the basis of the second critical communication 
lapse. 
B.  College Incidents 
1.  Key Facts:  Cho’s College Years 
During his freshman and sophomore years at Virginia Tech, Cho 
continued exhibiting extreme quietness and social isolation.122  Though he 
had few friends and very little interaction with his roommates, his parents 
maintained close ties with him through weekly visits.123  But Cho had not 
resumed mental health counseling.124  Nonetheless, there were no reported 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing privacy laws relating to Cho’s 
admission to Virginia Tech and his subsequent behavior as a student). 
 120. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794 (2010) (requiring students to 
request accommodations for disabilities). 
 121. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the nature of Cho’s mental illness). 
 122. See Information Privacy Laws, supra note 1, at 40–41(revealing Cho’s ongoing 
anti-social behavior). 
 123. See id. at 42 (noting that Cho was reluctant to interact with other students, despite 
the efforts of his roommates). 
 124. See id. at 40 ("[Cho’s] parents visited him every weekend on Sundays during the 
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behavioral problems or incidents involving Cho during his first two years of 
college.125 
In Fall 2005, however, as Cho entered his junior year, serious 
behavioral problems began to surface.126  While attending a party with his 
roommates, Cho removed a small knife from his pocket and began stabbing 
at the carpet in a female student’s room.127  Cho also began exhibiting 
disruptive behavior in the classroom.128  His poetry teacher, Professor Nikki 
Giovanni, expressed concern over the violent nature of his writings and his 
obstinate in-class behavior.129  Cho’s classroom confrontations with 
Professor Giovanni reached the point that she offered to place him in 
another class.130  When Cho refused, Giovanni informed Dr. Lucinda Roy, 
the Chair of Virginia Tech’s English Department, that she would resign her 
professorship if Cho was not removed from her class.131 
Dr. Roy agreed to withdraw Cho from Professor Giovanni’s class and 
tutor him herself.132  She also offered to provide Professor Giovanni with 
security.  Dr. Roy then notified a number of Virginia Tech administrators 
and departments regarding Cho’s violent writings, including the Dean of 
Student Affairs, the Cook Counseling Center, the Virginia Tech police 
department, and the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences.133  Dr. 
Roy further requested that Cho’s writing be evaluated from a psychological 
point of view and personally urged him to seek counseling.134  Though the 
Dean of Student Affairs shared Cho’s writing with a University counselor, 
                                                                                                                 
first semester . . . ."). 
 125. See id. (noting that Cho appeared to have adjusted to college life by his second 
semester). 
 126. See id. at 41 (describing Fall 2005 as the start of Cho’s downward spiral). 
 127. See id. at 42 (describing Cho’s behavior in a female student’s dorm room). 
 128. See id. at 42–43 (noting that Cho’s troubling behavior was not limited to social 
situations). 
 129. See id. at 43 (describing Professor Giovanni’s concerns). 
 130. See id. (noting that Professor Giovanni offered to transfer Cho to another English 
class). 
 131. See id. ("[Professor Giovanni] contacted the head of the English Department, Dr. 
Roy, about Cho and warned her that if he were not removed from her class, she would 
resign."). 
 132. See id. at 44 (describing Dr. Roy’s offer to tutor Cho as an alternative to his 
continued enrollment in Professor Giovanni’s class). 
 133. See id. at 43 (discussing the Care Team assembled by Dr. Roy to address concerns 
regarding Cho’s behavior). 
 134. See id. at 44 ("Twice during the meeting with Cho, Dr. Roy asked him if he would 
like to talk to a counselor."). 
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the counselor "did not pick up on a specific threat."135  The counselor did, 
however, suggest to the Dean of Student Affairs that Cho seek mental 
health counseling at Virginia Tech’s Cook Counseling Center.136 
Cho’s problems in Professor Giovanni’s class were also discussed 
among the University’s Care Team, a group of administrators charged with 
monitoring students with problems.137  After Cho was removed from 
Professor Giovanni’s class, the Care Team concluded that the "situation 
was taken care of" and did not refer his case to the Cook Counseling Center 
for evaluation.138   The Care Team never again discussed Cho’s case.139 
In November 2005, Cho’s behavior again raised concerns within the 
Virginia Tech community.140  Between late November and early December, 
Cho had two encounters with the Virginia Tech Police Department.141  In 
the first incident, on November 27, a female student reported that Cho had 
engaged in unwanted communication with her online, by phone, and in 
person.142  She declined to press charges, and the Virginia Tech police 
referred the matter to the school’s disciplinary system through the Office of 
Judicial Affairs.143  Three days later, Cho contacted the Cook Counseling 
Center, presumably at the recommendation of Dr. Roy and other professors, 
and requested an appointment with a psychologist.144  He was given a 
preliminary telephone screening, and an appointment was scheduled for 
December 12, 2005.145 
Cho missed his appointment with the University psychologist, but was 
triaged again later that day by telephone.146  The Counseling Center, 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. at 43. 
 136. See id. (discussing the counselor’s recommendation). 
 137. See id. (stating that the Care Team was aware that Cho exhibited disruptive 
behavior in the classroom). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. ("There were no referrals to the Care Team later that fall semester . . . ."). 
 140. See id. at 45 (noting that Cho had several encounters with the Virginia Tech Police 
Department beginning in November 2005). 
 141. See id. (describing two incidents involving female students). 
 142. See id. (describing Cho’s harassment of a female student on November 27, 2005). 
 143. See id. ("[T]he police officer warned Cho not to bother the female student 
anymore, and told him they would refer the case to Judicial Affairs."). 
 144. See id. at 45–46 ("This is the first record of Cho’s acting upon professors’ advice 
to seek counseling, and it followed the interaction he had had with campus police three days 
before."). 
 145. Id. at 46. 
 146. See id. (describing a triage as a brief interview with a prospective patient for the 
purpose of collecting data necessary to evaluate the level of intervention required). 
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however, made no referral or follow-up appointment for Cho.147  Yet, on 
that same day, Virginia Tech police received a second complaint from a 
female student regarding unwanted communications from Cho.148   The 
Virginia Tech police met with Cho and informed him that although the 
student had declined to press charges, he was to have no further contact 
with her.149  The incident received significant attention from staff members 
and administrators of the Office of Residence Life and the Office of 
Judicial Affairs, though no one brought the matter to the attention of the 
University’s Care Team.150 
Later that evening, Cho told one of his roommates, "I might as well 
kill myself."151  The roommate immediately contacted Virginia Tech police, 
who returned to Cho’s suite for the third time in as many weeks.152  Cho 
was taken for evaluation by a licensed clinical social worker, who described 
him on an evaluation form as "mentally ill" and "an imminent danger to self 
or others."153  The social worker recommended involuntary hospitalization 
and obtained a temporary detaining order from a local magistrate later that 
evening.154  Cho was then transported by Virginia Tech police to Carilion 
St. Albans Psychiatric Hospital for an overnight stay and mental 
evaluation.155 
The following morning, Cho received an independent, albeit brief, 
evaluation from a licensed clinical psychologist, who concluded that Cho 
was mentally ill but did not present an imminent danger to himself and did 
not require continued involuntary hospitalization.156  Cho subsequently met 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See id. (noting that the Cook Counseling Center conducted a second triage, but 
failed to make a follow-up appointment with Cho). 
 148. See id. (describing a second incident involving Cho and the Virginia Tech police). 
 149. See id. ("[A] campus police officer met with Cho and instructed him to have no 
further contact with the young woman."). 
 150. See id. at 46–47 (noting that the matter was not reported to the Care Team, despite 
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 151. Id. at 47. 
 152. See id. (noting that the Virginia Tech police returned to speak with Cho after 
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 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (noting that a local magistrate issued a temporary detaining order because 
Cho was unwilling to receive voluntary treatment). 
 155. See id. ("Police officers transported Cho to St. Albans where he was admitted at 
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 156. See id. (finding that Cho was "mentally ill; that he [did] not present an imminent 
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with a St. Albans psychiatrist, who also concluded that he was not a danger 
to himself or others.157  The psychiatrist suggested outpatient therapy for 
Cho—a decision based in part on Cho’s denial of previous mental health 
treatment.158 
Later that morning, at Cho’s commitment hearing, a special justice 
concluded that Cho presented "an imminent danger to himself as a result of 
mental illness," and ordered follow-up outpatient treatment.159  St. Albans 
arranged for Cho to make an appointment with the Cook Counseling Center 
that afternoon, but as it turned out, he again received only a brief triage.160  
Although this was Cho’s third contact with the Cook Counseling Center in 
fifteen days, the facility declined to arrange any follow-up treatment on his 
behalf or convey any information to the University’s Care Team or his 
parents.161  Cho would never return to the Cook Counseling Center for 
treatment.162 
Cho’s mental health continued to deteriorate in the Spring and Fall of 
2006.163  Like Professors Giovanni and Roy, several of Cho’s writing 
teachers expressed concern over the content of his essays, one of which 
anticipated details of the forthcoming shooting.164  Though several faculty 
members raised their concerns with Mary Ann Lewis, Associate Dean of 
Liberal Arts and Sciences, no one in the English Department was informed 
of Cho’s prior interactions with the Virginia Tech Police Department or the 
concerns raised among Residence Life staff regarding his behavior.165  
More surprisingly, Dean Lewis informed a professor just months before the 
shooting that she was unaware of any "mental health issues or police 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See id. ("[T]he psychiatrist did not recall anything remarkable about Cho, other 
than that he was extremely quiet."). 
 158. See id. at 47–48 (describing the psychiatrist’s decision to recommend that Cho 
receive outpatient therapy). 
 159. Id. at 48. 
 160. See id. at 49 (noting that "[Cho] was triaged again, this time face-to-face, but no 
diagnosis was given"). 
 161. See id. (discussing the collective failure by many to notify either Cho’s parents or 
the Care Team of Cho’s admission to St. Albans and his subsequent mental health 
evaluation). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. (noting that, in the Spring of 2006, "[t]he trend of disturbing themes 
continued to be apparent in many of Cho’s writings, along with his selective mutism"). 
 164. See id. at 23 (noting that the protagonist in an essay Cho drafted for a creative 
writing class "hates the students at his school and plans to kill them and himself"). 
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reports" involving Cho, despite being aware of the incident involving 
Professor Giovanni in Fall 2005 and recognizing a pattern of similar 
behavior.166 
2.  Second Critical Communication Lapse:  Red Flags in College Ignored 
Despite the awareness among Virginia Tech administrators, faculty, 
police, and mental health counselors of these troubling incidents, no one 
sought to discuss Cho’s behavior with his family.167  University 
administrators with knowledge of Cho’s conduct appear to have failed to 
assess the collective significance of his repeated entanglements with 
faculty, Virginia Tech police, and the Cook Counseling Center.  To be sure, 
it is unlikely that anyone at Virginia Tech had a full understanding of Cho’s 
problems.168  Still, the independent significance of these events—three 
encounters with Virginia Tech police in three weeks, coupled with three 
mental health triages at the Cook Counseling Center and an involuntary 
commitment hearing—should have sounded alarm bells with University 
administrators. 
It is unclear why administrators failed to reach out to Cho’s parents 
after these troubling events in 2005.  While it cannot be known whether 
greater awareness of Cho’s behavior among Virginia Tech administrators or 
his family could have forestalled his violence, it is likely that disclosure of 
any of the incidents leading up to the shooting would have resulted in 
mental health treatment or his withdrawal from school.169  It is clear that 
federal privacy laws allowed Virginia Tech to share information internally 
or with Cho’s family, but it is certainly possible that the laws as they had 
been understood in 2005 and 2006 made non-disclosure the likelier 
course.170 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. at 24. 
 167. See id. at 49 ("Cho’s family did not realize what was happening with him in 
Blacksburg that fall 2005 semester . . . ."). 
 168. See id. (demonstrating the lack of knowledge regarding the extent of Cho’s 
problems among the University community). 
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With the exception of documents relating to Cho’s commitment 
hearing, all of the pertinent records involving Cho’s conduct were either 
subject to FERPA privacy restrictions or to no restrictions at all.171  For 
example, documents maintained by the University’s Care Team relating to 
the incidents involving Professor Giovanni and other faculty members 
could have been disclosed under FERPA’s parental-notification 
exception.172  To the extent the Care Team felt constrained by FERPA 
prohibitions, it could have requested simply that Professor Giovanni, Dr. 
Roy, or others contact Cho’s parents directly to discuss their concerns in a 
manner that would not implicate the privacy rule.173  As it stood, FERPA 
applied only to documents or records related to or created in response to the 
classroom incidents and encompassed personal observations only to the 
extent they had been documented in such records.174 
Likewise, the Virginia Tech police were not prohibited from disclosing 
to administrators or Cho’s parents information regarding his unwanted 
contact with female students in Fall 2005.175 Law enforcement records are 
not governed by FERPA, and those maintained by the VTPD were subject 
to privacy restrictions only to the extent that they had been shared with 
University officials for non-law enforcement purposes.176  There is no 
evidence that such sharing occurred with respect to the three interviews 
campus police conducted with Cho in November and December 2005, or 
with respect to their transportation of him to St. Albans Psychiatric Hospital 
pursuant to the temporary detaining order.  Thus, the VTPD was free to 
disclose to Cho’s family or University officials the nature of its interactions 
with him.177  Though the incidents involving unwanted communication with 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See id. at 66 (explaining that campus health clinics are subject only to FERPA 
requirements). 
 172. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (describing FERPA’s parental notification 
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other students may have appeared relatively benign on such a large campus, 
had VTPD been made aware of Cho’s early entanglements with Professor 
Giovanni or known of his violent writings, it might have been in a better 
position to assess the need for disclosure.178 
HIPAA privacy rules did not prohibit the Cook Counseling Center 
from disclosing to Cho’s family or University administrators the nature or 
frequency of his requests for treatment.179  As a campus health care 
provider, the Center was obliged to observe FERPA’s, not HIPAA’s, 
privacy rules for its records.180  Though Cho never received treatment at 
Cook, he had requested and received three triage appointments in just over 
two weeks.181  This fact alone, had it been disclosed, might have been 
sufficient to alert the University’s Care Team or Cho’s family that his 
mental health was deteriorating at a rapid pace. 
Finally, neither FERPA nor HIPAA prevented the magistrate who 
granted the temporary detaining order or the special justice overseeing 
Cho’s commitment hearing from notifying Virginia Tech or Cho’s family 
that Cho presented a danger to himself.182  Though state law requires that 
records of commitment hearings remain confidential, the name of the 
person subject to the commitment and the fact of the commitment hearing 
itself is not private.183  In fact, commitment hearings in the Commonwealth 
of Virginia are open to the public; existing law protects only the records of 
the hearing.184  Likewise, no law prohibited the Virginia Tech police, who 
escorted Cho to St. Albans, or the Cook Counseling Center, which was 
notified following Cho’s release, from notifying Cho’s parents of his 
commitment hearing.185 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See id. at 70 (discussing how disclosure of information to the campus police could 
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Collectively, the independent decisions not to share critical 
information regarding Cho’s behavior likely reflected a broader 
misunderstanding of the privacy protections afforded to students.186  
Student privacy is an important concept, and an essential component of 
academic freedom, but privacy laws permit disclosure when it is necessary 
to protect the health and safety of the community or to communicate 
important information to the parents of tax-dependent students.  In the 
aftermath of the shooting, it became clear that Virginia Tech, like many 
institutions, was "hampered by overly strict interpretations of federal and 
state privacy laws."187 
III.  Conclusion 
The privacy laws in place at the time of the Virginia Tech shooting 
provided few legal barriers to the disclosure of key information relating to 
the shooter’s deteriorating mental health condition.188  Nonetheless, a 
presumption of nondisclosure permeated the campus, as it did most 
university campuses at the time.189  Faculty and administrators, as well as 
other Virginia Tech officials, appear to have felt hamstrung by the strong 
presumption in favor of student privacy.190 
Since the Virginia Tech shooting, student privacy laws have 
undergone significant clarification.191  The U.S. Department of Education 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See id. at 63 ("The panel’s review of information privacy laws governing mental 
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 187. Id. at 52. 
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("DOE") has backed away from requiring a strict construction of FERPA’s 
"health and safety" exception, and today permits institutions to "take into 
account the totality of the circumstances" when making privacy disclosure 
decisions.192   Further, the DOE has removed the fear of loss of funding 
from institutions making precautionary disclosures.193  So long as an 
educational institution has a "rational basis" for availing itself of the "health 
and safety" exception, the government "will not substitute its judgment" for 
that of the institution making the disclosure.194  The DOE, in conjunction 
with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, also published 
revised guidance in November 2008 to supplant the out-of-date and 
confusing standards promulgated in 2004.195  The revised guidelines contain 
answers to common but important questions of student privacy.196  Whether 
these revised guidelines will result in greater disclosure is unclear, however, 
as anecdotal evidence suggests that the FERPA privacy analysis is still 
"very much an art, not a science."197 
Today, it remains the burden of colleges and universities to educate 
their faculty, staff, and administrators on the requirements governing 
privacy law disclosures.  Equally important, however, is the responsibility 
of school administrators and faculty to seek clarification whenever a 
potential disclosure situation arises.  While few are in a position to prevent 
a mass shooting such as the one experienced in Blacksburg, Virginia, many 
in academia should educate themselves on the limitations and exceptions to 
student privacy laws.  This act alone may help prevent another tragedy. 
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